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EDITORIAL

This edition contains the report on the section of the questionnaire relating to categories of membership. Reports from other sections will be included in May. The low response makes it impossible to assess members' wishes and it is interesting to link this with the response from secretaries of Affiliated Groups last May. A printed form was included with the last magazine asking for information necessary to produce the News Letter. Only four replies were received and it was therefore impossible, for the first time, to publish the News Letter. This would seem to answer Miss Mauldon's query about apathy.

The article, An Extension of Vocal Accompaniment to Dance was unsolicited and very exciting to receive. It is hoped that readers will find it stimulating and useful.

We are now able to publish Professor Arnaud Reid's Laban Lecture delivered at the 1970 Conference. Members who were at the Conference will remember that, due to its length, there was no time for discussion, so Professor Reid has agreed to return for the 1971 Conference in order that his lecture can be discussed. The complete lecture is now printed for those people who wish to refresh their memories and as an opportunity for those who were unable to attend the Conference to read it and share the ideas expressed by Professor Reid.

MOVEMENT AND MEANING

(Lecture to the Laban Guild . . . February 14, 1970)
LOUIS ARNAUD REID

In this lecture I want to consider—and to compare and contrast—the idea of human movement as meaningful, in two different fields. games, sports, athletics (etc.) on the one hand, and *movement* as art, on the other.

'Meaning' is a large subject, which I can't explore generally here. I am concerned with meaning in a very concrete sense (putting a letter in the post box, cleaning the car, bowing, snarling)—the kind of meaning *this* movement has, in a game, or a long jump, or a dance, but with very special and particular attention to one unique kind of meaning, *aesthetic* meaning. Such meaning is exemplified both in the arts and outside them.

The relation between what has, at least until recently, been called 'Physical Education', and Dance, is topical, and controversial. I shall not touch upon that controversy here. I am concerned with concepts, assumptions, principles, ideas . . . which arise when these activities are practised or talked about; this is a philosopher's business.

The questions of aesthetic meaning, and their relation to sports and dance, which I am going to discuss are, as I have just been suggesting, general and philosophical in character. But, obviously, they do presuppose *some* knowledge of the fields which are your special *expertise*. How much of this knowledge must a philosopher have, if he is to talk any relevant sense? To put an absurdly extreme case: if some one had never seen any game or sport or dance, he clearly could not ask any relevant questions. But how much knowledge is required?

There is so much to be known. There is the inside knowledge which is the ordinary day to day currency of the experts—practical knowledge, the techniques of games, sports and dance, movements, strategy, choreography, and all the knowledgeable talk that goes with it. There is the scholarly understanding of scientific principles—mechanics, anatomy, physiology, psychology, sociology; there are cultural and historical studies. On the philosophical side, first-rate philosophical ability is required, educated through long experience not only in general philosophy, but in aesthetics, and in particular of the aesthetics of the fields we here are interested in.

If there exists in the world someone who possesses all this knowledge and all these qualifications in equal amounts—there is your paragon! Alas, in this modern world where explosions of knowledge occur daily, the 'universal mind' no longer exists. We only know, each one of us, little bits of things, acquiring some skills

and not others: even worse, the cultivation of some skills tends to inhibit others; or acuteness of vision here produces myopia there. You have skills, and deep knowledge and experience, which in me are wholly lacking. I have spent a lifetime reading, teaching and writing philosophy, a good deal of it in aesthetics. I can claim great interest in the questions of aesthetics which your activities seem to pose: but of your *expertise*, with all its inside understanding, I can only claim ignorance. I can only exercise a necessarily limited imagination upon a very few of your professional interests.

But you have asked me here. I am honoured, and welcome it, for the following reason. It is, that all increase of understanding is a *social* thing. If from each side, we give what we can give from our knowledge and experience, and equally, can listen and learn, there is a good chance—I would say a certainty, not only that the necessary limitations of our highly specialised approaches will to some extent be overcome, but that, positively, the conversation between people of such different *expertises* will enrich our understanding of the things each of us, in our different ways, care so much about. That is why I am glad of the opportunity, not just to give a lecture from a raised dais, but to open a real discussion. I with my background can certainly raise some fundamental general questions which I *think* are relevant. You can judge whether they are relevant or not; and you can correct me when ignorance leads me to state a problem or put a question in the wrong way, or to suggest a theory which does not fit the facts as you know them. So I hope that this lecture may be only the first move in a genuine exchange, a genuine conversation, from which I at least hope to learn a lot.

A preliminary warning. I shall spend a comparatively small proportion of time at the end of the lecture actually on Dance. But I hope that in the end all the earlier part will be seen to be directly relevant to Dance.

GAMES, SPORTS, THE AESTHETIC, AND ART

All sports are physical activities in which there is some definite practical aim or end to be achieved. Playing a game in certain ways, running, jumping, throwing, skiing, swimming, gymnastics, skating all are purposeful physical activities. But within this wide range there are, as has been remarked, all sorts of individual differences, some of which are relevant to questions about the aesthetics of sports. Games come at one end of a kind of spectrum. In most games competition against an opponent (an individual or team) is assumed. In a wide range of athletics, on the other hand—such as hurdling, flat racing, high or long jumping—competition against others, although part of any total picture of athletics, is not absolutely essential to the activity. In any of these sports one

can ‘compete’ for long periods only against himself. At the other end of the spectrum there are gymnastics, diving, skating—which in some cases may be dancing on the ice—in which grace, the *manner* in which the activity is carried out, seems to be of central importance. Of these last it can be asked with much point whether they do not have some *aesthetic* purpose ingredient in them, even whether they may not even be forms of art? Could such questions be significantly asked throughout the whole range? Of games it is commonly claimed that they have aesthetic as well as other characters. It is argued too that games are a form of art.

Sometimes the aesthetic character of *form* in games is emphasised—grace, economy, speed, skill, style, strategy, or drama (sometimes ‘tragedy’), or sublimity. Tonybee writes: “Games demand a sense of positional play, a pattern of design in movement, flowing and continuous, but basically creative and alive . . . Each match pattern and design is unique.” Moore and Williams write that in modern football “space, creativity, effort and rhythm” are major factors. Maheu, the Director General of Unesco, writes that “sport becomes akin to the arts which create beauty.” And “style—the expression of individuality which always reveals itself—occurs both in sport and art at the highest pitch of perfection.”* Maheu also claims that “spectator sports are the true theatre of our day.” He also thinks that sport effects the kind of purgation or *katharsis* to which Aristotle refers (though Aristotle never developed it). Professor Jokl cites Lewis Mumford as emphasising three main elements in sport: “the spectacle, the competition, and the personalities of the gladiators. The spectacle itself introduces the aesthetic element . . . The race is run or the game played within a frame of spectators, tightly massed: the movements of this mass, their cries, their songs, their cheers, are a constant accompaniment of the spectacle: they play, in effect, the part of a Greek chorus in the new machine drama, announcing what is about to occur and underlining the events of the contest. Through his place in the chorus, the spectator finds special release; he is now at one with a primitive undifferentiated group . . . Moreover the spectacle itself is one of the richest satisfactions for the aesthetic sense that the machine civilisation offers to those that have no key to any other form of culture: the spectator knows the style of his favourite contestant in the way that the painter knows the characteristic line or palette of his master, and he reacts to the bowler, the pitcher, the punter, the server, the air ace, with a view, not only to his success in scoring but to the aesthetic spectacle itself.”† Robert Carlisle, in a paper to

* These quotations are taken from D. W. J. Anthony’s “Sport and P.E. as a means of aesthetic education” *Sport and P.E.*

† E. Jokl, “Sport and Culture”, in *Doping. Proceedings of an International Seminar*, 1964. Pergamon Press, 1964.

the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, and elsewhere, argues that cricket and football are arts "dramatic and visual". The drama, and perhaps sometimes even the 'tragedy' of sport are eloquently advocated in an article by Laurence Kitchin on "Sport as Drama" in *The Listener*.^{*} Writing of the English Cup Final, 1966, he says: "It all turned on one player's mistake and elicited from Geoffrey Green of *The Times* a quotation from Yeats' *Easter 1916*, and a reference to tragedy. Young, of Sheffield Wednesday, had made an elementary mistake in trapping. Kitchin writes of Young's histrionic reaction "as he lay face downwards exactly like a Greek actor who beats his forehead on the stage in grief." Emphasising the tenseness of sport, he says: "What I am claiming for these examples is that they provide exactly the dramatic effects which it is the declared policy of the *avant-garde* drama to seek: that is, it is charged with the collision of conflicting environments and racial temperaments, climaxes as revealing the individual in extremity, bizarre 'happenings', and Dionysiac ritual." The world-game, he says, "is now the most formidable of all rivals to the theatre. It has conflict, character, a two-hour maximum, unity of time, place, and action. It has reversals and climaxes: in fact Aristotle qualifies as a founder member." "This is the authentic theatre in the round, from which Hungary's Manager made a thirty-yard running exit with both hands clenched over his eyes . . . Soccer is a drama without a script."

If we are going to assess these strong claims, we must get as clear as is possible within the scope of a single article what we mean by the 'aesthetic' and by 'art'.

THE NATURE OF THE AESTHETIC AND OF ART

I distinguish first what I will call 'the aesthetic situation'. (I shall be thinking only of aesthetic situations in which sense perception, or at least images of sense perception, are involved. The aesthetic qualities of pure mathematics, for example, would not be directly relevant to sport.) An aesthetic situation exists whenever a certain attitude is adopted, or called forth, to something which we perceive. This attitude may be called 'the aesthetic attitude'. In an aesthetic situation we attend to what we perceive in what is sometimes called a 'contemplative' way, and this attention may be deliberate (as when we give concentrated attention to pictures or music), or induced by something that strikes us without any deliberation, something which, perhaps, 'takes our breath away', or

'comes over us': this may happen in the presence of art, or nature. It may be like a revelation; we are "surprised by joy". Once it happens, the contemplatively aesthetic attitude comes into being, or may do so.

The word 'contemplative' does not imply passivity or inactivity. Even when we are quietly sitting or standing still, a great deal may be going on: and a dancer or actor in the full activity of dancing or acting is often, perhaps always, in some degree contemplating the product of his own activity. In playing a musical instrument it is very important to *listen* to one's own playing.

This contemplative element is very important when we distinguish, as we must, between the 'practical' in an ordinary sense, and the aesthetic and the artistic. Painting a picture or playing the piano, is in one obvious sense a practical activity. So is driving a car, or playing a game of football. But the inner motivation makes the two sets of performances quite different sorts of action. In one case, the aim is to thread the traffic skilfully and with reasonable expedition in order to get to one's destination, or to score a goal or otherwise enter into the strategy of a game: these are determining motives. The painter, or the artist playing on a musical instrument, is also getting things done, but the whole process of doing is infused by the aesthetically contemplative motive: it is not 'practical' in the *same* sense as we use the word of ordinary practical activities. In this paper, when I say 'practical', I shall be using it in the ordinary sense, unless specified otherwise. This distinction will be important when we come to consider aesthetic aspects of games.

For the most part we see the world in a practical sort of way, getting about, avoiding obstacles. We see the landscape with its coloured spreading fields and trees, the grass green, the sky blue or grey. On the other hand, when the aesthetic attitude is taken up, or is evoked, we find that we are attending to the forms of what we perceive, in a sense 'for their own sakes'. The forms of things come to have a special sort of meaningfulness. A landscape, or a piece of shell or wood on the shore or woodland, the flight of a seagull or the movement of a dancer, seem to embody a unique kind of meaningfulness. This 'meaningfulness' is difficult—perhaps even impossible to define*, though familiar enough in aesthetic experience, and 'meaning' here means something quite different from meaning in other contexts, in moral situations, or in scientific

[‡] Proceedings of the Society, Volume 3, January 1969.

* October 27, 1966.

* It is discussed at length in my book *Meaning in the Arts*, Allen and Unwin, Muirhead Library of Philosophy, 1969.

or philosophical discourse. One may use words about aesthetic meaning, but it has to be known immediately and can never be adequately translated into descriptive sentences.

It is possible to take up the aesthetic attitude to anything we perceive, to anything whatever; in this sense, anything at all can be what may be called an '*aesthetic object*'. When we do take up the aesthetic attitude in this experimental way, we are on the lookout for some positive aesthetic satisfaction. But our expectations, our hopes, alas, are often frustrated. The experiment fails. One may look at slagheaps, or a dirty littered street, or a gawky walker in a pedestrian race, or a clumsily-checked movement in football . . . and find not positive, but negative aesthetic values. (It is true that an artist might use this, or any unpromising material in the making of a work of art which would have positive aesthetic value. But that is another story.) In this situation, though (a) our (experimental) *attitude* is still '*aesthetic*', (b) the *object* of this attitude is '*aesthetic*' only in the sense of being the object of the attitude. It is not '*aesthetic*' in another sense (c) of having positive aesthetic value. Applying this to sport, we may say that anything in sport can be an '*aesthetic*' object in senses (a) and (b): but only some things in sport are '*aesthetic*' in the sense (c) that they have positive aesthetic value.

So far, I have been talking about the aesthetic, and not, except in passing, about art. From one point of view, the aesthetic is a much wider conception than that of art. '*Found objects*' can have positive aesthetic value; but they are not art; they are outside art. Nor is the beautiful flight of a bird, art. Many movements in games or athletics or gymnastics have great positive aesthetic value; but it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that they are *art*, any more than the flight of the bird is art. Again, though to some spectators a game may appear dramatic, it is quite wrong to assume that the players involved in the game are at all like actor-artists on the stage, who are performing a drama to be apprehended aesthetically. When we are talking about the category of art, as distinct from the category of the aesthetic, we must be firm, I think, in insisting that in art there is someone who has made (or is making) purposefully an artifact, and that in his purpose there is contained as an essential part the idea of producing an object (not necessarily a 'thing'): it could be a movement, or a piece of music) in some medium for aesthetic contemplation. I do not of course mean that an artist is consciously *saying* this to himself: one would not suppose that a primitive artist ever articulated it at all (and some contemporaries would hate the language). But without aesthetic purpose—maybe overt at times, but covertly influencing everything that is done—the artifact would not be an art artifact. This is not of course a full

account of what art is; but I believe it says something essential.* And it will be found very important in the sequel to keep this distinction clear; it has the closest bearing upon the claim that games and some other sports are forms of art.

EXPRESSION AND AESTHETIC EMBODIMENT

I must now say something about *expression*. I have argued, in my book and elsewhere, that the central concept of the aesthetic is not expression, but *embodiment* of a unique kind, and that the kind of expression that there is in art is transformed in its embodiment in a medium. It is necessary to say something about both expression and '*embodiment*'.

'Expression' is a word of many meanings—too many to go into here. One of them is the expression of feeling and emotion. In art, a person may 'express himself', express feelings and emotions. In a very different way, the player of a game may express feelings of aggression, triumph, or sheer animal spirits. Or if one watches the sometimes extended and elaborate preparation of an athlete on his mark for a sprint or a long jump, it certainly looks as though something very intense is going on, and a tension released in the action. But though feeling and emotions may be expressed in sport, it would be wrong to say that sport just *is* that expression. So it is certainly wrong to say that art just *is* expression of feeling or emotion. (It is often enough said.) Susanne Langer, who is a very sophisticated and subtle expressionist, is very clear that this '*symptomatic*' expression is *not* what art is. Art is the presentation of something in form, to be enjoyed aesthetically; it is not just the expression of your, or my, feelings.

Another sense of expression is that art expresses ideas. This contains some truth but it is not accurate, or sufficient. Philosophy,

* I am well aware that this account cuts out as *art* much of what is given various labels—'pop' and others. To import into a gallery a walking stick and chair, a collection of soup tins, a urinal . . . does not make '*art*' of any of them. (And it seems to me pretentious and pompous to dignify it by the name '*satirical art*'. A man like Duchamps may import a manufactured object into an art-gallery in a satirical spirit: but that does not make '*art*' of the object. If, as I have said, *anything* can be looked at experimentally with aesthetic expectation, perhaps hope, this could include soup tins and a whole binful of the rest. I am sure that all sorts of things are imported into exhibitions to induce us to *look* at them as we might not in life outside the gallery; this may have educative value, even if sometimes the objects are utterly banal. But it is a sheer messy muddle between '*object of the aesthetic attitude*' and '*art*' which leads to the pretension that anything at all will do as '*art*'. A little deflation of word-magic could go a long way to saving money and curing gaping self-deception. These confusions and banalities do great harm to the reputation of art as a serious subject of culture and education. If *anything* is art why waste precious time—perhaps a lifetime—working at art?

science, history . . . express ideas, but they are not art. Certainly in drama, poetry, the novel, the dance, there is expression of ideas: but this does not differentiate them.

In most, I think all, art, there is an expressive element. Thoughts, ideas, experiences, feelings about things . . . are present in the artist who is making or about to make, and the making somehow 'expresses' them through the use of a medium. This is clearly true of literature, which expresses the artist's feelings and thoughts about things—in different ways in novels, poetry and drama. It is true of traditional painting and sculpture and dance. It is, less obviously, true of what are usually called the 'abstract' arts—for instance some contemporary sculpture and painting. Painters like Kandinsky or Mondrian, or composers of non-programmatic music, do not overtly expound exactly nameable life-themes. Yet 'abstract' patterns of shape and colour, patterns of sound of different pitch in different timbres, are in themselves expressive. It is familiar, for instance, that in the visual field the horizontal and the vertical, smooth or sharply angular lines, the hollow and the solid, the dark, the light, vivid or quiet colours . . . are expressive, even though it is impossible to say *exactly*, when they are incorporated in a work of art, what they express. In architecture and dance alike, gravitational pull, and the overcoming of it is enormously symbolic. One 'stands up' to it. The heart 'sinks', the body and spirit 'sag'—or rise up in 'victorious joy' . . . The same kind of thing, *mutatis mutandis*, can be said of musical forms.

This is vague language: art has a "close connection" with life-feelings and ideas: art is expressive, but it is impossible to "say exactly" what is expressed. Here is not just a defect of exposition; there is a very good reason for the vagueness. The reason is that, although it is probably true that all art is in some way expressive, meaningful in the sense that the artist is expressing something, *what* the meaning is can only be known directly in the experience of the completed art. It is so because the meanings *expressed* become meaning-embodied. The meaning of the poem can only be known by reading the poem aloud with understanding, the meaning of the music can only be fully known through playing or listening to it with understanding. The meaning of the architectural form is *in* it. The meaning of a dance, similarly, is known only in the dance itself. And 'understanding' here is itself a living event, a living-through-experience of the work in its full concreteness. Words, talk, study (of poetry, music, dance, drama, painting...) can enrich and illuminate understanding, but aesthetic understanding can be fulfilled, consummated, only in direct living experience of this or that individual work of art. Because it is individual (as distinct from its being a particular instance of a concept) there can

be no adequate translation of aesthetic meaning into general terms. Meaning (once again) is meaning *in* the perceived form of the medium of the particular art it happens to be. In one metaphor, an artist is married to his medium. With his mind-and-body brimful of ideas, feelings, desires he meets his medium (paint, clay, sounds, words, movements of the body . . .) in intercourse—each medium, like each woman, with its own obstinately independent characteristics. Out of the union comes a new being. Continuing the metaphor, it is this new being which we as spectators see. The artist was involved in the coition and also (the metaphor goes a little astray here!) in the time-taking pregnancy. He sees the new being too, but with, perhaps, the biased eye of the father. Take or leave the metaphor, which cannot do justice to the unique thing, artistic creativity, what stands out is that the aesthetic meaning, though drawing and derived from life-events beyond art is embodied in the medium, an emergently new creature. Macbeth, Becky Sharp, Anna Karenina, are real enough, 'out of life': yes, but they are also *out of life*, their full meaning known only in the play or novel. So, music can grow out of jubilant, or tragic, experience: but if it is truly music its 'jubilance' or 'tragedy' is never accurately so named; their qualities are the qualities of music, not of life outside music. Limited (often misled) by language, we—strictly speaking—miscall music 'sad'. The sadness of life is one thing, the musical quality of music another. The word 'expression' emphasises, at times dangerously—the drawing-from-life aspect, 'embodiment' emphasises the transformation, untranslatability, irreducibility aspect.*

THE AESTHETIC, ART AND CRAFT: AND THEIR RELATION TO GAMES AND OTHER SPORT

In considering the relation of art and the aesthetic, first to games, and then to some other forms of sport, we must distinguish between the attitudes and experiences of the active participants on the one hand, and the spectators on the other. Spectators of games may come to them with very different attitudes. At one end of the scale there are the strong partisan sportsmen, the fans who, though they are interested in the game for itself, are dominated by the desire that a favourite team should win. The fan may never have heard of the 'aesthetic', and would not be interested in it if he had. Other fans, who equally enjoy the game, and are strong partisans too, do have some sense of beauty, elegance, style. They may even think that games are a kind of art. Then there are the spectators, less sporting, less knowledgeable perhaps about the game, less partisan, who view games mainly as an aesthetic spectacle. For spectators in any of these groups, aesthetic elements appear at least

* All this is very complex and controversial and is discussed at length in my book.

now and again, though they may not be called by that name. The word 'beautiful' is sometimes freely used—of a dribble, a tackle, the stroke of a batsman. On the other hand, as Mr. Ray Elliott points out,** much football is aesthetically displeasing. In other sports there are many moments of grace and beauty. A pole jump, a ski run or jump, movements in gymnastics and diving—one can see their beauty at once, and it can be seen again, with new delights and from new angles, in slow motion film. All these a spectator can see from his relatively contemplative point of view.

What about the players themselves? In actual games-playing, the direct aim is certainly not aesthetic; the dominating aim is to win the game by playing it well—from which the infinitely various individual actions get their meaning. In other sports—not necessarily competitive as games are—the aim is equally practical and not aesthetic—to clear the hurdle with as little check as possible, to reach the tape in the shortest time. At the time, for the participants, the fulfilment of these functions is completely absorbing. It is a vital experience, enjoyable in some sense of the word—perhaps aesthetically—but there is no time whilst the operation is going on to dwell upon aesthetic qualities: this any trainer would insist upon. Afterwards, the participant may look back upon his experience contemplatively with perhaps some aesthetic satisfaction.

The aesthetic qualities of games and sport are by-products—for the participants and even for the most aesthetically-minded observer, if he is really interested in the sports or games as such. They can be an important and precious by-product, but by-products they are none the less. This is most obvious in games, where the desire to win is ingredient in the very purpose of games; but it is also true of most other sports, for instance those athletics which are governed by strict rules, and governed by the yardstick and the clock.

Here too there is, very often, competition, but competition against other actual opponents is not essential to them as it is in games. One can 'compete' against oneself, try to improve one's own standards. This is true also of sports like skiing and climbing, where there are not the same kinds of rules, if rules at all. The standards here are objectively assessable; in a wide sense they are measurable achievements demanding a high degree of skill. And there are at the other end of what I called the 'spectrum' activities—to be considered later—like gymnastics and skating. These although they are all norm- or rule-governed, are also under judgment, with its subjective element: *how* the movements are

carried out, their 'style'—these are taken into account when they are assessed under competitive conditions. Sometimes they are called the 'artistic' merits of the performance: whether this is justified I shall discuss later.

To come back to games and the wide range of athletics (other than those just mentioned). What, in the light of all that has been said, are we to think of the claims that games, and some athletics, are forms of art, carried out by artists? Let us look at it first from the point of view of the active participants.

We have first to be sure about the way in which 'art' and 'artist' is being used. The use is often very wide indeed, including reference to skill and craftsmanship. We may speak of the 'art' of the wood- or metal-worker, particularly when it is very fine, or is rather special, as with the master craftsman-maker of musical instruments. Craft here seems to slide into being art; we speak, too, of footballers or cricketers as 'craftsmen' or 'artists'. We may say of a batsman, for instance, that he is the 'perfect artist'.

The differences between *art*, and *craft* cannot be discussed here. But the games player is certainly a craftsman.

The playing of cricket or football is a kind of craft. Before a professional game the captain or manager may lay down a plan or policy to be followed in the game; conforming players are craftsmen in so far as they carry out this policy. But the plan or policy can only be of general guidance; players have to use their own quick judgment and initiative in the particular circumstances of the game—for of course no two games are the same. (This is the craftsman modifying and freshly determining his action as he works . . .) Dr. Hans Keller (who remarkably combines in his person the expertise of an ex-ski instructor, a musician and a profoundly knowledgeable soccer fan), has shown how geniuses among players (awkward customers sometimes for the manager of the team) can, at times with brilliant success, discard or even reverse the pre-ordained plan.* Again, in cricket, though a strategical policy may be laid down (sometimes in professional cricket, at the expense of interest and initiative), the individual player—let us say the batsman—is out on his own, the craftsman dealing with the situation as it arises from moment to moment. The craftsman batsman, particularly if he is a genius, is delightful to watch; there is great beauty in his actions, exactly meeting the momentary situation in the most perfect way.

Existentially there is close relationship between art and craft: good artists are craftsmen, and good craftsmen are at least some-

**In his paper to the Conference on Aesthetics and Sports at Salford.

* See third reference in page 18.

times artists. But there is still an important conceptual distinction between the two, although a fine one. Collingwood defined the distinction between art and craft by saying that the craftsmen carries out a predefined plan, whereas the artist discovers in the making.* This will work up to a point, but not beyond it. We might describe the maker of a Chippendale chair as a craftsman in so far as the shaping of the wood exactly according to the design goes, and an artist when he begins to add his own individual finishing touches. A metalworker turning out on a lathe standard shapes with the use of a gauge, is craftsman pure and simple. The master maker of the musical instrument is pure craftsman up to a point, but he can be more. For Stradivarius, the delicate finishing of the—importantly functional—sound holes of the "Hellier" violin of 1679, the symmetrically carved scroll, the decoration of the inlaid tendril motive—this is craft which insensibly merges into art.* Another example of craft becoming art is the rosette of a Stradivarius guitar.**

What of the conceptual distinction between art and craft? Collingwood's theory will not do. Stradivarius made many careful drawings beforehand to work to; these guided his work; so far he conforms to Collingwood's account of the craftsman. "The craftsman", he says, "knows what he wants to make before he makes it . . . This foreknowledge is not vague but precise."† But though this is true sometimes, it is certainly not so always. Stradivarius had his careful plans: but "the extraordinary results which he obtained he owed entirely to his great genius, which was able to combine together in complete harmony both wood and varnish, dimensions and general shape and all the other incalculable factors." Yet, though dealing with the unforeseeable as it occurs is a characteristic of some crafts (another example would be pottery), and certainly the *artist* deals with the unforeseeable and discovers through working in his medium what he could not completely have foreseen, what he had not exactly planned beforehand—it does not follow that the craftsman in so doing becomes an artist, that discovering through working in the material is what differentiates art from craft: to assume that it was so would be a logical fallacy. It would make many (though not all) craftsmen, artists. As craftsman, Stradivarius' aim was to produce the most perfect-sounding instrument; this is a practical aim, and the craft (including its element of discovery in the making) is a means to this end. The aim of the

* For description and illustrations of this and other fine work, see *Antonius Stradivarius*, by Dirk J. Balfoot. The Continental Book Company A.B., Stockholm.

**Op. cit. p. 42.

† Principles of Art, circa p. 16. Oxford, 1938.

‡ Balfoot, op. cit. p. 40.

artist on the other hand is, as we have said, is to produce a form for aesthetic contemplation. It is clear enough that Stradivarius had this aim also, and was artist as well as craftsman. Existentially the two are continuous and indivisible; but the craft and art elements are distinguishable.

We can now apply this distinction to games.

Should the craft in football or cricket be called 'art'? If what I have said about art is valid, then 'No'. In cricket, for instance, the motive and intention of the batsman to play the game in the best possible manner includes a dominant desire to score. In pursuance of the aims of the game, his play may be exquisite, often aesthetically exquisite. As watchers, we can see and feel this. The batsman may enjoy it too, although at the moment of play he has not time to dwell upon it. But to produce exquisite strokes for contemplation is not part of his dominating motive as he is actually engaged in the game—if we define the 'dominating' motive (in art or cricket) as that without which the activity would not take place. The dominating motive (conscious or not) of the artist is to produce a form for aesthetic contemplation; the dominating motive of the player of a game is not this, but to play the game for the end or purpose of the game. Aesthetic enjoyment is part of the whole—certainly for many spectators, and partly, I should imagine, for the player himself, though he may never use this language. But the aesthetic enjoyment is parasitic upon the central *games*-purpose of the game. Aesthetic purpose is not central, as with Stradivarius carving his scrolls, or Menuhin playing Bach. The games player, as such, is not an artist in any strict sense, though he may have something of the artist in him. And if the aesthetic aspect of the game were emphasised by the player—or trainer or manager—the game would certainly go wrong as a game, as it does not go wrong if the aspect of games-craft is emphasised.

Art and games, then, share some things in common; but this should not tempt us to identify them. Devotion is common to the dedicated games player and to the artist, but it is devotion to different kinds of activities and experiences. Again, there is expression in both games and art; but expression in games as such is not artistic expression. Games may 'express', in the relatively superficial sense of relieving tensions, e.g. of aggression; many inhibited impulses are legitimised in the framework of the game: games, too, may express interest in strategy and tactics. But they do not, as art does, present, or represent, these and other impulses and ideas transformed in embodied form for contemplation. Games do not 'represent' anything, nor do athletics.

It may be replied to all this: 'If art is meaning-embodied as you say, are not games meaning-embodied too?' In a sense this is true, but at a crucial point there is a crucial difference. Certainly meaning in a game is intrinsic to it. This piece of play has its meaning in the context of the game. And a particular game is (in this respect like a work of art) something new and individual which has never exactly been played or seen before. On the other hand it is possible to describe a game with its strategical moves, quite vividly in words, whilst it is not so possible to describe a work of art. Radio descriptions of games can be exciting; but no one could describe the music of a symphony on radio. But more important, the already-mentioned character of art which games do not share is art's assimilation, through expression, of meaning from the life beyond art, and its transformation in embodiment; to produce this meaning-embodied is art's central purpose. One could put in other language the general contrast between art and games by saying that art assimilates what *transcends* art and transforms it into its *immanent* embodied meaning. Art's meaning is both transcendent and immanent. Meaning in a game, on the other hand, is wholly immanent in the game as it is played. The game, though it is expressive in some ways, does not transform life-meanings from beyond itself in a presented embodiment. In some carefully limited sense of the words, art is 'about' life beyond art; games are not 'about' life, but a specialised and controlled form of life itself.

ARE SOME SPORTS, ART?

There is (I suggested) a sort of spectrum in sports, with games (competition built into them) at one end, and at the other end activities like some sorts of gymnastics, skating, diving. One obvious difference between these and games is that in them, the way in which they are done has to be judged by a person (including the sportsman himself). This counts in the scoring or total assessment; sometimes the quality of performance is called 'artistic'. The way in which a game is played is of course also something which is very important for players and spectators. But, as we have said, it is not in itself art, and it is not counted in the scoring which could, in principle, be done by a machine.

What are we to think of the claim that these other sports have some quality of art in them? *Prima facie* there seems to be a case for consideration. At points the line between sport and art is difficult to draw. A crucial case is figure skating: can this be clearly distinguished from dancing on ice? Dancing is an art: is figure skating?

There seems to be a *prima facie* case. But we must be careful not to assume without examination that the qualities of which a

judge has to take account in diving or gymnastics or skating are 'artistic' qualities. Could it be that the concern of the judges for smoothness, rhythm, grace, etc., is a concern for, strictly speaking, *functional* perfections, and not for genuine artistic qualities? The judge in a competitive event has to judge a gross movement, a single continuous action which sometimes takes place very quickly. Is it just (e.g.) efficiency of flow which he is assessing, efficiency which might be marked more objectively by, say, a computer-cum-slow-motion-filming machine? Is it truly 'artistic' quality? If so, then a judge, a man of aesthetic perception, is required. No machine could assess original artistic value.

Let us look at these rather special sports first from the point of view of the performer rather than that of the judge.

There seem to be two clearly distinguishable aspects in the learning and perfecting of a piece of gymnastics or skating. On the one hand, there are the prescribed movements. The pattern to be performed is laid down beforehand; high skill and technique, together with long practice, are needed to carry it out. The operating has to be learned slowly, bit by bit, and, at the early stages of learning, the main concentration must be upon carrying out the movements with as great functional perfection as possible. (It is very like the earlier stages of learning a difficult piece of music.) This is one side, of physical performance. Suppose now that the gymnast (etc.) has become master of his bodily movements, can do them, let us say, in a smooth, fluid way, with the appropriate rhythmic alterations of tension and relaxation. Through discipline and mastery he has attained a new potential of freedom. Taking his skill of movement as something he is master of, he is now able, if he so wills to be something of an artist. His sense of the value of movement may be said to be expressed in the movements and embodied in the new free form which he gives to it. Though the gymnast, skater, diver . . . still works within the prescribed rules, he is freed to give the movement expressive form which is his own creation, and which is meaning-embodied.

There are two distinguishable things here, as I have suggested. They are, that is to say, distinguishable conceptually. There is the highly skilful, highly perfected carrying out of the assigned movements—carried out, admittedly, in an individual way, and with an individual style, the style of this particular sportsman. But there is something else, infused into it, the expressiveness aesthetically embodied in the movement, done with 'style' in a different sense, artistic style. It must however be stressed that this is a *conceptual* distinction, of two distinguishable aspects within a single existential whole. The final movements are what they are, single and not

double; they are not the prescribed movements carried out according to formula, *plus* aesthetically expressive movements. It is, simply, that the movement, carried out in accordance with the general formula, has aesthetic quality fused into it, transforming it into an art quality; this is recognisable and distinguishable but not separate. There is nothing very obscure here; in art it is a commonplace. A performing musician may play with perfected technical skill, but if he is a musician, skill alone will not make him so. If he is the true artist, his skill is taken up, assimilated into his art.

Are we to conclude then, if cautiously, that some diving, some gymnastics, some skating, is art, and the exponents artists? I do not simply mean that, as in other sports, they produce aesthetic values by the way, as a by-product. The question is whether the production of aesthetic value is intrinsically part of the purpose of these sports. (If so, on my assumptions, they will be in part, at least, art.) Two sorts of answers are possible, of fact, or of philosophical opinion. The answer (a) to the factual question is, I think, 'Yes'. Where judges (not just scorers) are required for sports like figure skating, they are in fact expected to take into account what are conceived as 'artistic', or 'aesthetic' factors. My second answer (b) (a philosophical opinion) is that this is in fact a justified practice, that there are indeed not only aesthetic, but artistic elements in these special sports.

I have been careful to suggest that, in a few sports at least there are artistic *elements*, or aspects. Unless it can be said (for instance) the intrinsic and dominating purpose of some gymnastics, or figure-skating, is to produce expressive form embodying meaning aesthetically, these sports could not be called 'art' without qualification; they would still be sports incorporating artistic elements. Whether anyone does want to go so far as to call them art, rather than sport, I do not know: we may leave this question open. If it were so, it would be making a virtual identification between them and a form of dance. And, at the very edge of the 'spectrum', it is, admittedly, very difficult to distinguish between competitive figure skating (at the highest levels), and dancing on ice.

DANCE AS ART

Whatever we think of these activities as containing artistic elements or even as being art and not sport, there is no doubt that *dance* is on the other side of the somewhat vague border between art and sport, Dance is art.

But before I go on to Dance, a word of modification. I am contrasting games, sports, etc., with Dance as *art*. I am sure the contrast is valid if we think of Dance in its sophisticated, civilised, artistic development. But art springs from life, and the two are often inseparably intertwined. There is the claimed 'drama' of the football field. Some Dance springs from religion. There are war-dances, initiation dances, fertility dances, or the Dionysiac and the Apollonian. There is folk dance of all kinds. There is dancing on the village green as well as ballroom and pop dancing. What is 'art'? What is religion, ritual, sex, partial self-hypnosis—and what is just good fun?

These are large questions. Here I am only concerned with Dance in perhaps a limited sense, Dance as developed or developing art.

Dance as an art fulfils the general conditions of art mentioned earlier in the paper.* Movement in dance has aesthetic purpose, the purpose of creating an object for aesthetic contemplation, in this case a complex pattern of postures and gestures.

Dance, like art generally, is expressive in various ways—though we must add at once, expression transformed in embodiment. Meaning in dance is embodied in the unique way in which meaning-embodied is characteristic in all the arts. Apprehension of this meaning arises directly out of our experience of the formed medium—in dance the pattern of postures and bodily movements. The form of dance, like the form in all art, is a 'symbol' in a unique sense; it is a symbol to which I give the technical name 'embodiment-symbol'.** Meaning in dance is only apprehended by paying acute attention to the significant form—attention given in one way by the dancer, in another way by the spectator. This is different in kind from the sporting attention given to the movements in games.

GESTURE AND MEANING, IN LIFE AND DANCE

I take it here (though it is debatable) that the medium of dance as an art is Gesture, any expressive movement of the body. ('Gesture' is of course being employed here much more inclusively than usual: often it means nothing more than a movement of the hands or arms.) Bodily movements in ordinary life are expressive in various ways. They are sometimes symptomatic, showing states of mind, sometimes they are relieving, sometimes they indicate ideas which it is difficult to put into words, sometimes they are used as a definite language to sign or signal what we mean.

* "Sport and Art: the concept of mastery." *The Listener*, August 14, 1969, p. 229.

**See *Meaning in the Arts* pp. 67-71, 195-202.

Dance is not a complicated organisation of life's gestures, nor even a constructive supplement to them: gesture is the *medium* of dance, and the medium is *used* in the creative transformation of art. Gesture as a medium retains its general character of human expressiveness (of different kinds,) but embodied in dance, meaning is new. Dance is a created structure in which there appear individual embodied meanings which never existed before. The creation of dance, like the creation of any art, is a discovery of meaning which only comes into being when the dance is made and carried out. Because its medium is gesture, dance may express feelings or ideas which are *connected* with feelings and ideas previously existing (and feelings and ideas of course exist before—or as—the creation gets going). But dance is not just expression of something already there implicitly, and made explicit in the dance. It is (once again) discovery of new feelings, ideas, meanings.

In life outside art, gestures are expressive partly in that they point back to ideas and feelings already there. In life, a person is angry or fearful or loving; he moves in an angry or fearful or loving way: his movements are expressive of the state of mind he is in. Further, these states of mind (ideas and feelings) exist in relation to situations in the world the person lives in. They are not just inner states, but *about* things—about someone he is angry with, or something he is afraid of or someone he loves. When we see his movements, if we understand them, we can say instantly, 'He is angry with X, afraid of Y, in love with Z'. Our statements about his feelings are the—crudely translated—interpretations of his movements. His movements get their meaning from his ideas and feelings about things.

Expressive movements in real life tend to be stereotyped and limited, often indicative rather than fully expressive of what lies behind them, not very individual. This does not greatly matter, so long as they fulfil sufficiently their biological or other useful functions, or, as far as other people are concerned, if they sufficiently communicate the ideas or states of mind behind them. The spectator is not ordinarily interested in attending carefully to forms of the movements themselves; to him they are chiefly indicators, indicators of life-meanings.

In dance it is the very opposite. In dance it is not the life-meanings (meanings as they are in life outside dance) signalled, the ideas or feelings which the movements indicate—which are the main focus of interest: the central object of interest is the *form* of the movement itself, and our attention is directed to that. Again, the feelings we have as spectators when we see the *dancing* of

'anger' or 'fear' or 'love', are not comparable to the kinds of feeling we may have when we see in 'real life' movements of a man who is angry or afraid or in love. In real life we may be sympathetic to the man who is behaving in one of these several ways: in dance such sympathy with the dancer would merely be ridiculous: his movements do not express his own personal states of mind; their meaning now—their aesthetic meaning—is of a different order. And the meaning is apprehended, not by human sympathy with the dancer, or by seeing movements chiefly as indicators, but through attention to form.

The movements of dance, to which we give the most intense attention, do not, then, fall into the same category as the movements in life outside dance, more or less stereotyped, often biologically stereotyped. Further, a dance is a highly complex construction of the medium of movement, aesthetically organised, completely individual in the sense of possessing a concrete integrity unique in each dance. The meanings which movement has in life outside dance fall into a different category from the meaning of movements inside dance. The meanings of life-movements are understood in the context of real life—anger at things or people, fear of danger or loss of face, love of a friend . . . The meanings of dance-movements (perhaps in some cases dancing 'anger', 'fear', 'love') are understood in the context of the new imaginatively constructed forms of dance which are the focus of our attention. In the dance-Gestalt their 'look' and 'feel' and significance is different from the look and feel and significance of the (somewhat) similar movements in a life-Gestalt. The dance of Romeo and Juliet is a dance of tragic romantic love, but the meaning of tragic romantic love in the dance is quite a different *sort* of meaning, aesthetic meaning *sui generis*, from the meaning of tragic romantic love in the life outside art. For the dancers, and for us, it is something which is autonomous; their, and our experience is different—'out of this world', we may say.

DANCE, EXPRESSION, AND LANGUAGE

I have said that dance is not, essentially, expression of ideas or feelings already existing. In an article in *The British Journal of Aesthetics**. I criticised Mrs. Susanne Langer's oft repeated view of art as expression, or symbolic projection, of the 'life of feeling'. I

* October, 1968.

find great obscurity in this. Feeling, I have argued elsewhere,* is always of something; the verb 'to feel' is epistemologically (though not grammatically) in some sense transitive; feeling is a form of cognition or has a cognitive aspect. We cannot cognise, or feel, without cognising or feeling something, even if it is the obscurest organic or mental stirring: we feel sad or angry or frustrated in real life (as I said) about something. The feelings are not just private subjective buildings-up inside us. Feeling entirely isolated from some content or object is a non-entity. Put in another way, if feelings are feelings-of, the recognisable character of a feeling is something concrete and individual, not just 'feeling' but the 'feeling-of-XY'.

If this is so, life-feelings can never strictly be 'projected' into art forms. Feelings-in-relation-to-life-situations are one concrete thing, feelings-in-relation-to-art-forms are another concrete thing. If I may quote from myself: "'Expression' and 'projection' (here of feeling) seem to be the wrong words and the wrong ideas for formulating the *essential* nature of art. What happens is that in creating a work of art a new complex object comes into being, and in our aesthetic experience of it we come to have new feelings, and new structures of feelings, which are not just the projections of the forms of the feelings of life, but now vital feelings themselves, not just 'how vital and emotional and intellectual tension feel' . . . (Langer) but new and fresh vital tensions relevant and specific to the meaning specifically embodied in this thing before us, nowhere else and never before." Applying this to dance, the feelings of, and for, the forms of dance, attended to with focal concentration, though undoubtedly *related* to the feelings of, and for, various life situations, are concretely new: they are, as I suggested, discoveries, not a previously-existing life of feeling now expressed in dance. Dance is not expression of "the form of feeling"; the 'form of feeling' which occurs when we dance or contemplate dance is new; it is the form-of-the-feeling-of-dance. And this feeling, when dance is good art and apprehended with discrimination, is not stereotyped, like many of the feelings we have in relation to ordinary life-situations; it is infinitely subtle and individual, indeed in potential, endless.

In the light of all this, it is now worth looking briefly at the common claim that dance is a 'language'.

* In three articles in the '20s (*British Journal of Psychology*, July, 1923, pp. 78-93; *Journal of Philosophy*, August 1924, pp. 492-8; *Mind*, April, 1931, pp. 154-174), in *Meaning in the Arts* (1969, Allen and Unwin). Chapters VIII and IX, and in a Chapter, "Feeling and Understanding", of a book (title as yet unknown) edited by Ralph Smith, to be published by the publishers of *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* in 1970.

In ordinary life, as we saw, gesture sometimes has linguistic meaning in a quite straightforward sense: sometimes it is expressive of what is not easy to state clearly. When we come to dance, everything, as we have seen, is altered.

If calling dance a language means that it communicates meaning, this is true enough, although the meaning communicated is in a category of its own. But to say that dance is a language inevitably suggests (or is taken to suggest) much more than this. It suggests that, like ordinary language which has a dictionary, certain gestures have specific designative meanings, and meanings outside the dance-form. This is very marked in accounts given of oriental—e.g. Indian—dance, in which it is explained that particular movements in dance, sometimes very minute movements e.g. of the hands, fingers, eyes, are symbolic in the ordinary designative sense: movements A B C have specific meanings, X Y Z; without knowledge of these meanings we are said to miss much of the point of oriental dance.

I am not here expounding this kind of dance, and am certainly not competent to do so. And of course I am not suggesting that Indian dance *is just* the designation of meanings by specific gestures. But I would say that any account which strictly insists that the art of dance is a language in this sense, kills the very idea of dance as art. Dance is meaningful; it communicates meaning: but all that is meaningful, and all that communicates meaning, is not therefore a language in the sense described.

Consistently with what I have been arguing, it seems better to say that dance sometimes (not always), *uses* gesture language in the sense mentioned, but that it transforms its meaning (in the designative sense) radically in the new context of dance as art. How this happens may perhaps be illuminated by looking at another art, poetry. The medium of poetry is words with meaning in the ordinary designative dictionary sense. Although poetry uses, and contains language, it would be misleading, I think, to say that poetry *is* 'a language' in the ordinary sense. We may use here Mrs. Langer's fundamental distinction between symbols *in* art, and what she calls the 'art symbol'. Words with meaning in the ordinary sense are examples of symbols *in* art, symbols which art contains. And symbols in the ordinary sense are sometimes contained in painting or even in music (examples are found in Bach's Passion music). But the *aesthetic* meaning of art is not just the meanings of those symbols, though they contribute to the aesthetic meaning. It can be useful, at some stages of coming to understand a poem, to paraphrase it, putting it into other words, and to say what the words and sentences mean. But the paraphrased meaning, though it may

help us to understand the poem better, *is not* the meaning of the poem or in the poem itself. This can only be known fully by reading the sounding words aloud with their weight and rhythm and balance, with full aesthetic understanding of the meaning-embodied. Dance, likewise, is fully charged with meaning-embodied which can never be said adequately in words, and it is hardly possible, I think, to avoid misunderstanding if one speaks of dance as a 'language'. To do so is bound to suggest to many people that like ordinary language, it can be translated accurately into some other language, that one can point to the gestures in dance and say what they mean. As a strict statement this dualistic view (dance, and the statement of what it means) is as wrong as the view that poetry can be accurately said in a paraphrase. Aesthetic meaning in poetry and dance alike can only be fully known by living in and through the art itself. The art is not divisible into two: it is one single (though complex) thing. To repeat: art may use language in an ordinary sense, but the meaning of art is not the meaning of language in the ordinary sense. The ordinary meanings which art may use are transformed in the total embodied Gestalt of the work, and they do not, thus embodied, point exactly to anything outside themselves. The dance, like any art, takes up ordinary things and transforms them into its own flesh and blood, its own unified organism.

'VIRTUAL' MEANING AND ACTUAL MOVEMENT

I have been speaking of the view that dance is a language, as a kind of 'dualism'. Mrs. Langer tends, I think, to perpetrate different sorts of dualism. One is the 'symbolic-projection-of-feeling-view' which I have criticised. But I have in mind now a different dualism of hers — between artistic meaning, which she often calls 'virtual', and the physical aspects of art — e.g. the actual physical movements of dance. In *Feeling and Form** she uses words like 'virtual', 'illusion', 'semblance'. Dance is (p. 175) a "virtual realm of Power,—not actually physically exerted power, but appearances of influence and agency created by virtual gesture. In watching a dance one does not see *people running around*; one sees the dance driving this way, drawn that way, gathering here, spreading there—falling, resting, rising, and so forth; and all the motion seems to spring from powers beyond the performers. In a *pas de deux* the two dancers appear to magnetize each other; the relation between them is more than a spatial one, it is a relation of forces; but the forces . . . really do not exist physically at all." I do not wish for a moment to deny the important truth in this; art is 'virtual' in this sense. But it is also real in another, also artistic

* circa 174 sq.

sense. It is in the actual movements of the artist that we discover these 'virtual' meanings. This is very important in the total experience of the dancer; and the sense of actual movement is very important in dance education. Again, Mrs. Langer says that dance on the stage is 'illusion': (she expounds 'illusion' at length, and it has much point). Dancers seem captured by forces not themselves, often seeming to defy gravity. And it is of course true that the actor is not having actual personal experiences of love or hate or whatever it is that he is depicting. But 'illusion' can be a misleading word. 'Illusion' is opposed to 'real', and the dancer, and we, are apprehending something artistically real and not illusory, something in which the *actual body-experience* of embodiment is ingredient. Dance, though it has meaning in one sense transcending ordinary experience, is also an intensely *incarnate* experience, and it is misleading (and loose), I think, rather grudgingly to say "The bodily movement, is, of course, real enough" or "It is *actual movement*, but *virtual self-expression*" (p. 178). Or, it is form "conveying" ideas. The relation between the actual (movement) and the "virtual" (etc.) is much more intimate than Mrs. Langer's words suggest. The 'virtual'—if we may still use the term—is literally seen and felt in the actual physical movements of the dancers, and they at first hand and we by perception, sympathy and empathy, know it in our 'bones'. One of the reasons why dance is so important, in itself, and as education, is that transcendent aesthetic meaning is discovered in the actual living experience of created, but profoundly felt, bodily movements. It is not just that bodily movement is a means for representing, or symbolising, something else. Mrs. Langer knows all this, but I do not think that a good deal of her language is consistent with it. And it stems from making expression and not embodiment, the key idea. One accepts her affirmations, but suspects her denials. The physical movements of dance are not simply means to the 'virtual' and then forgotten; the physical movements are an inseparable part of the total thing which is the art. The total thing is physical movement *with* its new emergent quality which she calls 'virtual'. It is not a dualism: there is one single entity—a complex monism of two aspects, conceptually distinguishable but existentially and artistically inseparable.

'PROGRAMME' DANCE AND 'PURE' DANCE

All that has been said on embodied meaning has a bearing on alleged differences between two classes of dance, dance (a) with a story and (b) what is called 'pure' dance. (a) Familiar examples of dance with a story are Petrouschka, Swan Lake, the Sleeping Princess. 'Modern Dance' too, often has a programme or story. I have argued by implication that there cannot be exact point by

point correspondence between the items of any story and a dance: the story is, rather, a general theme upon which a dance is constructed. But some knowledge of the story is needed, or much of the meaning in the dance will be missed. Rudolph Laban, in his book *The Mastery of Movement* mentions the story of Adam and Eve, and of "Eve, our first mother, plucking the apple from the tree of knowledge". He asks: "Can an actress represent Eve plucking an apple from a tree in such a way that a spectator who knows nothing of the biblical story is made aware of both her aims, the tangible and the intangible?" He thinks on the whole not—though the artist can pluck the apple in many different ways. But someone in complete ignorance of the story with its intricate symbolic implications would miss the main point of the dance (though he might enjoy the dancing). But when this is said—that it is the story of Adam and Eve which is done into dance—the story is *done into dance*. The story becomes transformed and is made into a new thing in its embodiment in the medium; the new thing is a dance. The dancer feels, and we see and feel, meaning which, as we have said, can never be accurately translated back into the verbally told story. This is absolutely vital. Dance and other arts spring out of life, and they may have stories, though not always definite and specific ones. But the story is one thing, as the paraphrase of a poem is one thing, and the poem as it is read expressively aloud is another. So is the dance another thing. In one direction there is a forward movement, from life into dance. But the movement is not strictly reversible because of the transformation, the new creation which has taken place. In the new Gestalt of the dance the story element does not disappear; we are aware, though perhaps subconsciously, that a story is being danced. But the look and feel of it is transformed. It is story-dance, but predominantly dance.

This is story dance, dance with a programme. By (b) 'pure dance' on the other hand is usually meant dance without a story or programme, or perhaps one so simple and general that it might be stated in a sentence. This is the descriptive use of 'pure', and is unobjectionable. The word 'pure', however, is ambiguous and to some extent evaluative—'pure' versus 'impure'. This could be misleading. There is nothing 'impure' about dance with a story, any more than there is anything impure about poetry because poetry uses words with ordinary meanings. The story in dance is done into dance: what we attend to is the dance: in that sense it is as pure as anything could be, so long as it is good dance.

But if 'pure' dance in the first, descriptive, sense really meant dance with absolutely *no* story, or no life-derived content at all, it would be a contradiction of the very idea of dance. Dance is never pure in the sense of being *only* a pattern of sheer movement in

space: dance is not moving sculpture; it can never be as 'pure' as that, and would not be dance if it were. The medium of gesture, expressive human movement, is intrinsically meaningful, though it is not possible to say exactly what it means once it is part of dance. In this way, the medium of dance is quite different from, say, the media of sculpture or painting or music; these are not as physical media apart from the body *intrinsically* expressive, though they instantly become so when we perceive them.

Clarification of the ambiguities about 'pure' and 'impure', and the affirmation of a difference of degree only between two sorts of dance, may throw light upon the difficulties which some choreographers feel about writing programme notes for a dance-theatre-audience, giving them some idea of what a 'pure' dance is 'about'. Some do offer notes: others say 'No', arguing that the audience must discover from the dance itself what its artistic meaning is, that to offer notes is to impose pre-judgment, to violate the freedom of the individual spectator's freedom to interpret for himself.

But, surely, it is only a question of emphasis? Certainly the dance must speak for itself. On the other hand, if in story-dance (or in Indian dance where there is a kind of code-key), some suggestions of ordinary story meanings are only pre-conditions of coming to enjoy with aesthetic understanding the meanings-as-embodied in the dance, and if they do not destroy this aesthetic understanding or violate the freedom of each person to make his own interpretation, why should a hint or two do any harm in the case of pure dance? In both kinds of dance, aesthetic transubstantiation of meaning takes place. In both cases (to use a vivid sentence from Martha Graham quoted recently by Norman Morrice, chief choreographer of the Ballet Rambert) the dancers, and we, are "born into the instant now". In both cases, the aesthetic meaning is freely discovered in the context of the actual dance. So why not allow the hints which are, after all, only preliminary suggestions?

For reasons already given by implication, the analogy of pure music (e.g. the fugue) which has not, and *ought* not to have, any verbal programme, must not be pressed. The 'subjects' of pure music are already purely musical, and the medium of music in itself is not intrinsically expressive as is human gesture, the medium of dance. Because the medium of dance is human movement which has human meaning before dance ever begins, and it is *people* who move, there are, inevitably, implications of ordinary meaning already present. But the ordinary meanings incorporated and transformed into dance can sometimes be ambiguous. A circling movement of the arms inwards towards the body might mean a feeling

of cosmic enclosure, or embracing love, or a shutting out, or greed . . . A movement outwards of the arms might also mean a feeling of cosmic inclusiveness, or generosity, or rejection, or simply shooing off. Tense bodily postures might express fear, or anxiety, or hostility; relaxed ones may express deep peace, or simply 'don't care'. These translations are of course far too crude: and meaning in dance, as in life, is gained from the context. But a spectator, at least one seeing a pure dance for the first time without any hints to help him, *can* get into a bit of a muddle, and can miss a good deal. The choreographer did have some ideas which started him off and gave direction to a pattern of movement. Does it harm anyone, or the dance, to have a hint or two?

DANCE AND EDUCATION

The space taken up in this paper by the discussion of the difference between the significance of movement in games, sport, etc. and in dance, make it impossible to say more than a word about the place of all these in education. But one can at least assert that experience of these differently significant kinds of movement are important in education because they give insights which are different in kind from the knowledge acquired in other scholastic subjects, knowledge of 'the head', the brain, the mind, rather than of the whole involved embodied person. Most scholastic education is acquired through the use of words or other symbols. These symbolise ideas of various kinds, which in turn give us increased understanding of the world. But experience of the arts in general and of dance in particular is *direct* knowledge of meaning, unique, unparalleled, untranslatable—and it is given only by active participation in the arts. There is no substitute for it. For brevity's sake, I will quote from a recent article in which I have spoken of this.

"In other studies, the symbols mean by *mediating* concepts of entities independent of them. The symbolic languages of science or history express concepts of different aspects of a world independent and in some ways remote from them. The relatively independent mind (relatively independent of the total organism) does the thinking which interprets the symbols. But immediately presented art in a sense, as we said, *contains* its meaning; meaning and symbol are internally related. And the whole mind-and-body, working together indivisibly, apprehends meaning directly. Art-experience is the most direct kind of knowledge we have, and it has a fullness, unity and completeness unknown elsewhere. We know, by imaginatively living-through it, the aesthetic meaning, and we discover new life in the knowing. The aesthetic symbol does not direct our attention away from the symbol to life and things. It draws meanings from life and things into itself—things as loved, hated, marvelled at, enjoyed, felt with sense of tragedy, comedy, disturbance, peace,

dynamic portent . . . an infinitely variegated world of values, personally felt, but transformed in embodiment into untranslatable new meaning which must be known intuitively in aesthetic experience or not at all."*

Dance is of course only one of the arts; everyone cannot dance. But the development of perceptive art-experience—dance or any other—in education is needful and urgent, particularly perhaps in a day and age when the young are revolting against so much in civilisation that is unreal and artificial.

* British Journal of Aesthetics, July 1969, pp. 283-4.

AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO
DANCE
by JANET E. BEAT
WORCESTER COLLEGE OF EDUCATION

My work, both as composer and educationist, has led me to try to devise ways by which contemporary music can be performed and created by students and children. Except for the work of a few teachers who have brought contemporary idioms to the classroom, musical education is still based on the styles and conventions of the past, while today's style is mostly ignored. Working with students of movement and dance at Worcester College of Education I have noticed that avant-garde music acted as a strong stimulus in the creation of dance, and I have therefore tried to build on this interest and, in so doing, to extend the students' aural and creative perceptions.

My own sympathies in contemporary music lie in the fields of electronic and aleatory* composition. In particular I admire the compositions of Stockhausen and Penderecki, whose music has greatly influenced the experimental work I am about to describe. My starting-point has been (a) such electronic transformations of the human voice as in Luciano Berio's *Omnimagio a Joyce*, in which a woman's voice is heard reading passages from Joyce's works in English, French, and Italian; and Stockhausen's *Gesang der Jünglinge*, in which a young boy's voice is multi-tracked into many parts and is accompanied by purely electronic sounds: and (b) the choral textures exploited in short but telling passages in Penderecki's *St. Luke Passion* and *Dies Irae*, in which the chorus is not only expected to sing in the accepted manner but also to speak, babble, murmur, and shout.

The unaccompanied voice is the most natural and flexible musical instrument, and I have therefore used this as my basis. To perform music which only exploits aspects of sound which are inherent in speech, and which, hitherto, conventional music has mostly ignored, no specific musical training is required. The advantage to movement and dance lies in the fact that these sounds may be organized to provide a continuous web of sound which, from a musical point of view, is more satisfactory than the isolated vocal sounds often used as an accompaniment to dance. Other important factors are:

- (a) a wide new range of textures and colour;
- (b) the music can be composed to match the exact needs of the dance;

* *Alea* is the Latin word for dice. Aleatory music is therefore the music of chance, the composer preferring the notes chosen at random by the performer to notes prescribed by himself.

AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE

- (c) textures and sonorities can be organized into a coherent and interesting whole;
- (d) the music will be in present-day idiom, bringing an immediacy and relevance to the dance in a way which music of the past cannot.

SPOKEN SOUNDS

(A) CONSONANTS. In conventional music the singer vocalizes on the vowel sounds in the words and makes but little use of consonants. But, while still making use of vowels, a performer may profitably emphasize the consonants also. Consonants can be (a) rhythmic, or (b) explosive, or even (c) mellow. They can serve the same purpose in vocal music as the percussion instruments in orchestral music, and provide rhythmic impetus as well as a delicate tissue of sound to which may be added more highly coloured material. Thus a new dimension can be added to choral texture.

For example, the word "shot" contains three different colours: (1) the *sh* can be extended into a long band of sound, not unlike the white sound of electronic music in quality; (2) the *o* can be spoken or sung to a note suited to the pitch level comfortable to any voice; (3) the *t* can be rapidly repeated in an explosive manner:

- (1) sh—
- (2) o—
- (3) t t t t t tttttt

Thus the word may be performed as:

Exercise 1.

- sh—————o t t t t t t t||
- sh.....o t———.

Other expressive consonants are:

- (a) those with a mainly sharp and percussive effect:
k as in "kick". This can be used singly to punctuate a texture, or rapidly repeated.
d as in "dead". Similarly treated.
r may be rolled thus, rrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.

- (b) those which may be extended into colourful bands of sound:

- s* as in "hiss", s———||
- sh* as in "shot", sh———||
- th* as in "earth", th———||
- ts* as in "hits", ts———|| (accent the *t*)
- ks* as in "kicks", ks———|| (accent the *k*)

AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE

A useful exercise consists of placing these consonants side by side, making a distinction between their individual characters (the downward arrow indicates the cue to be given by the conductor).

Exercise 2



Exercise 3



More rapid alterations of these sounds in an even rhythm (the horizontal square bracket means perform in a regular rhythm) can give you a regular pulse, if required, as thus:

Exercise 4



Yet another sound can be obtained from *s*, for instance:

Exercise 5




Here the rising and falling arrow indicates *s* as in "hiss" with a rapid increase in breath pressure followed by a slow decrease. Once again, this is effective if performed in a regular rhythm.

(B) CONSONANTS AND VOWELS. Here are a few words which lend themselves to colourful treatment:

"grass", performed as grrrrrrrrrrrrra—*s*—||, or with the vowel shouted (CAPITAL letters indicate shout), thus, grrrrrrr*A*s—||.

"hurricane" can be performed as hurrrrrrrrrrr!CANE, or as hurrrrrrrrr!kkkkkkkkkANE, or by raising the pitch of the voice on the rolled *r* as



"sinks" can be performed as *s*—INKkkkkkkks—||. Words used in this way should be performed in unison to gain the most powerful effect, rather than by single voices; but this is only

AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE

one aspect of word manipulation, and should be used in conjunction with other sounds to build up interesting sonorities.

The next group of vocal techniques are best performed with each person adopting a different tempo and a different pitch level of voice from that of his neighbour. *A total lack of synchronization should be aimed at* to gain the richest and most varied texture. In such textures the composer determines the colour and density of the score at a given moment by choosing the vowels and consonants, but allows the performers to interpret his instructions according to the individuals' choice and abilities. The pitch level of each voice and the individual tempi may be chosen at random by the performers, *provided they do not all adopt the same pitch and speed of execution*. The composer usually indicates the ideal, or minimum, length of time to be taken over the passage, but the conductor may extend the time-limit if an especially telling sonority is produced. These textures are best obtained by a large group of performers, because the denser the sound the more interesting are the multi-rhythmic possibilities, and the denser the cluster of notes the more exciting the harmonic clashes.

(C) VARYING PITCH LEVELS, COLOURS, AND SPEEDS. This style of composition depends on juxtapositions of varying densities of highly-coloured blocks of sound. Whispering, murmuring, and babbling fall into this category.

(1) WHISPERING. A quiet yet pulsating texture is obtained by whispering, especially if the words contain sibilants. A gentle crescendo ensues if the whispering gradually changes to normal speech, and the reverse process is equally attractive. In Exercise 6 all the performers adopt a speed of word repetition different from their neighbours, and all the words are to be repeated until the conductor brings the passage to a close. The performers must stop immediately the conductor so indicates, even though a word or sentence is incomplete. A wavy line means whisper, and a wavy line opening out to a hairpin means whisper gradually changing to normal speech.


Exercise 6



AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE


Spatial effects are easily organized by using two or three groups of performers whose normal speech sections are staggered as follows:

Exercise 7



In the next exercise each line of the poem is heard emerging in normal speech from different groups at various points in the room, while everyone unites to speak the last line in a regular rhythm.

Exercise 8



(2) MURMURING gives a denser, darker sound. Here the performers should vary the colour of their voices and the stresses given to the words. The sign indicates murmur.

Exercise 9



AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE


(3) HUMMING is another quiet to moderately loud texture whose sonority can be coloured by the pitch of the voices, that is, using a variety of high, medium, or low pitch levels. A very dense cluster of notes ensues if the whole range from high to low is used simultaneously. Humming on different consonants adds yet another colour to the palette. The letter in the shaded box shows which hummed colour to use (mm, nn, b*), the length of the box determining the duration.

Exercise 10



The position of the boxes in relation to the broken line shows the pitch levels to be used: high, above the line; medium, on the line; low, below the line.

Exercise 11



(4) A very striking sound, once more reminiscent of the electronic medium, is a MIXTURE OF HUMMING AND SINGING. The sign indicates *hum on the consonant then gradually open your lips for the vowel sound*




gradually open your lips for the vowel sound. Practice Exercise 12 in two ways (a) with the voices in unison and (b) with each performer choosing a different pitch level. All the performers should adopt the same tempo in this instance.

* The *b* should be buzzed continuously, not reiterated.

AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE


Exercise 12




SUNG SOUNDS

Humming leads naturally to sung sounds. For these the composer simply indicates whether they are to be high, medium, or low, not an exact pitch such as B flat etc. The performer chooses a note which is comfortable for him to sing within that given register. Sounds sung in this manner, unlike the whispered or hummed, have the advantage of a wide range of dynamic levels from *ppp* to *fff*. The sign [] means sing a note, high, or medium, or low, according to the position in relation to the dotted line, and hold it according to the conductor's beat. Aim at obtaining a dense cluster of notes; each member of Group 1 must sing a different high note from his neighbour, and each member of Group 2 similarly a different low note.

Exercise 13




Exercise 14



AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE


A wedge shaped box means that the voices are to drop out one by one as the conductor makes a horizontal clockwise movement of the baton or hand. When the baton points directly at a performer, he ceases to sing.

Exercise 15



Vocal glissandos are very arresting if used sparingly. The voice can slide either up or down over a long or short distance. If the whole body of performers glissandos over a long distance, each choosing a slightly different pitch for the voice, a dense band of sound is heard to slowly descent or ascend. On the whole, descending glissandos are the most effective.

Exercise 16




AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE

Shorter quicker glissandos in which each person adopts his own tempo and pitch level, can be used for aleatoric passages. The approximate distance covered by the voice can be indicated by a number placed in the arrow-shaft, 3 . For example, 3 indicates


drop the voice over the distance of a major or a minor third according to choice*. Naturally, larger intervals will take fractionally longer to perform than the smaller ones, therefore you may either design a passage which mingles only the shorter intervals, such as thirds, fourths, and fifths; or the longer ones, such as sixths, sevenths, octaves, and ninths etc.; or you may combine the greatest possible variety of intervals in a truly improvisatory manner. Practice glissandos passing over all the intervals, then practice a variety of glissandos at random. Now practice this technique in two groups each of which has its own characteristic group of intervals.

Exercise 17



Both spoken and sung sounds may be performed with a vibrato by patting the hand rapidly in front of the mouth. This is shown by the sign ↑


Exercise 18



* Such musical 'distances' may have to be demonstrated to the performers.

AN EXTENSION OF VOCAL ACCOMPANIMENT TO DANCE


Exercise 19



ORGANIZED SYNTHESIS OF FOREGOING RESOURCES

All these vocal sounds are intended to be organized into a satisfying composition in its own right. Any one technique may be applied by itself or combined with others. The combination of techniques is generally the most interesting because multi-coloured layers of sound can be built up in this way. For instance, using random murmuring as a background, a pattern may emerge in a regular rhythm such as in Exercise 20.

Exercise 20



NOTES TO WOULD-BE COMPOSERS

Composition is the organization of sound patterns into a satisfying and coherent whole. You are free to use any means at your disposal so long as the result has design and gives the impression to the listener that there is a scheme of which the creator is in control. This definition of composition allows great freedom while

also imposing the discipline of ordered thought on creation. The kind of composition whose elements I have tried to outline must not be undertaken any more lightly than composition in a historic musical idiom. Composition is a craft which encompasses both technique and imagination, as well as inspiration. From this point of view it is advisable to base your first compositions on settings of poems, for then the poem's structure will determine the organization of your piece. I have found that the short, evocative tanka and haiku of the Japanese* are well suited to this kind of colourful word-setting, or even the collage-like assembly of ideas in the verse of such poets as Adrian Henri and Hans Magnus Enzensberger†. Of course, totally unrelated words may be chosen purely for their rhythmic or colour properties, and a note-book of such words should be compiled by the class, who may also write their own verse with a musical setting in mind.

There is no standard notation for this kind of music so you may invent your own, though it is advisable to base your new signs closely on accepted notation already worked out by composers using this technique. This has the advantage of not facing your performers with too many unfamiliar symbols to absorb. Where new notation has to be designed this should be as descriptive and as self-explanatory as possible.

Finally, this type of composition is only really effective if large numbers of performers are used, therefore, unless you have such numbers at your disposal I do not recommend writing for more than three groups, as the various vocal sounds are only telling if there are several performers to each part. As such compositions need concentration on the performers' part, it would be as well to record the piece before you dance to it, though this would not exclude the chance of live sounds being added to the recorded ones in performance.

As examples of this type of composition, two short pieces are available (at a small charge to cover production and postage) from: Miss J. E. Beat, Worcester College of Education, Henwick Grove, Worcester.

All exercises in this paper are copyright. © J. E. Beat 1970

* Japanese Verse (Penguin Books, 1964).

† Penguin Modern Poets, vol. 10, *Henri, McGough, Patten* (1967);
Penguin Modern European Poets, *Hans Magnus Enzensberger* (1968).

QUESTIONNAIRE REPORT

The response to the questionnaire was disappointing; 22.6% of the total membership replied! Is this perhaps an indication of an apathy existing within the ranks, or does it reflect a satisfaction with what exists? One can of course be generous and think that pressure of work prevented many from taking time to read and answer the questionnaire.

The following breakdown of results deals only with those questions designed to test opinion of members regarding categories of membership and methods of establishing differentiation. Other replies regarding dance as an examination subject, courses and conferences and the magazine issue have been forwarded to Council members whose responsibilities lie in these specific areas and interest has been taken in some of the constructive comments and suggestions.

I would like to take this opportunity of thanking those Guild members who did find time to reply and I hope that their opinions will be taken into account when future policy decisions are taken.

E. MAULDON.

SOME RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE CIRCULATED TO ALL GUILD MEMBERS

Percentages are based on the total membership of 984 stated on the 1969 Annual of the Guild.

Total number of returns was 222, a percentage of 22.6.

Of these

61% were Associates

34% were Full

the remainder being made up of Hon.-Members and Fellows.

Of the Associates

62% were replies from members of between 1 and 5 years' membership

38% were replies from members of 5 years' membership and over.

Of the full members who replied

90% were from those who have been members for over 5 years
10% were from members of 4 and 5 years' standing.

Of the total number of replies

59% were in agreement with the present categories of membership

41% did not agree.

Associates	79 agreed	48 disagreed
Full	42 agreed	35 disagreed
Fellows	3 agreed	2 disagreed

Of those who disagreed

- 50% thought there should be no categories
- 22% thought Ass./Full
- 20% thought Full/Fellows
- 8% thought Ass./Fellows

70% of those who agreed with categories also agreed with the present method of establishing differentiation.

Those who agreed with categories but not the method of establishing differentiation offered several interesting alternatives.

Of those who thought there should be no categories the majority thought there was no need for a Guild examination:

41 members against 20 members for.

In reply to the question 9 re. Standard Examination

51% were satisfied with the present form
49% were not.

More Associates were satisfied than NOT.

More FULL members were dissatisfied than satisfied.

Of those who were not satisfied the majority seemed to favour

- (1) different types of examination
- (2) different standards of examination

Question 16—detailed results appended.

Of those who made positive replies to this question:

64% were for C.S.E. 36% were against C.S.E.
62% were for G.C.E. 'O' level. 38% were against.
55.5% were for G.C.E. 'A' level. 44.5% were against.

MOVEMENT IN SILENCE AND SOUND

by V. R. BRUCE

Published by G. Bell and Sons Ltd.

Price 14s.

In this book Dr. Bruce has set out to help teachers who do not possess wide and confident musical ability in themselves, and who find this a handicap when trying to help children to work with movement allied to sound and music. She recognises that those teachers and students are often the victims of poor and discouraging musical experience in school and that Colleges of Education have too little time for the help and rehabilitation such people so much need. The harm done cannot quickly be remedied and this book is the outcome of Dr. Bruce's concern for the problems of these teachers.

The book begins with an informative chapter on the association of Music and Dance in the realms of professional Dance and in Society. She then outlines the opportunities in movement teaching to help in the development of musical and rhythmic sensitivity in children of all ages. This she does more successfully in the section devoted to older pupils. It would have been helpful if she had outlined more carefully the uses and abuses of introducing sound and music with infants and young juniors. For all ages she offers many suggestions, but these seem to be offered in a somewhat disconnected way.

The problem for the teacher is the recognition of how sound, aural rhythm and simple musical form can be developed in close accord with the child's own stages of growth in creativity, movement ability and movement memory. Help is needed in recognising when in these stages, sound and music might be helpful or merely distracting to individuals in the early primary stages of education and the inappropriateness of introducing sound and music to the whole class.

Likewise, more consideration could have been given to the recognition of when invented sound could be introduced and why, to older pupils and how such exploration could be enriched by comparing it with professional sound compositions in percussion or electronic music.

Dr. Bruce could have helped such experiments as all teachers are bound to make by suggesting vital points of observation. For example, does the quality of the children's movement improve when music is introduced or does it deteriorate? Is it the music that is wrongly chosen, or is it introduced too soon? Do the pupils dis-

cover richer forms of personal or group expression when the sound or music is added? Do their movements become stilted and formal or over repetitive? For what purpose was the sound or music introduced?

This book offers a selected choice of music to which teachers can refer. This will open up resources for some and may save time, but unless the teacher is able to borrow from a record library, it is an impossible task to select satisfactorily. Time for listening and making notes for future eventualities is the most likely way to begin to build up musical resources. Dr. Bruce could have mentioned that some Local Authorities have established lending libraries of records and these are of inestimable value, especially if the teacher can visit the librarian and discuss her needs as well as offer suggestions.

The title of Dr. Bruce's book is somewhat misleading. She is dealing primarily with movement allied to sound and music. Silence is a vital part of movement expression and communication and could have had a section to itself. Under this title more space should have been given to this aspect, for silence not only helps children to become aware of kinetic rhythm and response but has dramatic implications and uses. Sensitivity to silence is also important in developing relationships between dancers and groups. Movement without sound is a different experience from movement with an awareness and use of silence.

It is to be hoped that teachers reading this book will not feel that sound and music are essential to the movement lesson, but will realise that so much valuable experience of rhythm and 'inaudible music' as Laban described dance, can be developed through movement alone. This is especially true for young children, but also for older ones and adults who have not had the opportunity to develop rhythmic and musical sensitivity.

Dr. Bruce's book will, however, not fail to interest those teachers and students who are looking for help with the choice of music and use of percussion, and she is herself well aware of the risks and pitfalls underlying her sincere effort to give guidance.

D.J.

GUILD MEMBERSHIP

FULL MEMBERS

Bowler, Miss E., London
Lowden, Mrs. M., Sussex

Laflin, Mrs. P., Suffolk
White, Miss Joan, Surrey

NEW ASSOCIATES

Aitchison, Miss S. M. H., Scotland
Aldcroft, Mrs. K., Cheshire
Alton, Miss P., Hampshire
Anderson, Miss I., Monmouthshire
Anderson, Miss P., Harrogate
Ashe, Miss P. A., Cardiff
Atkins, Miss J., Yorks.
Bent, Mr. C. P., Derby
Bishop, Mr. G. T., Surrey
Bolton, Miss V. G., Sussex
Broadbent, Miss A. M., Herefords.
Bull, Miss M., Sheffield
Cathro, Mrs. S., Sussex
Chambers, Miss M. P., Essex
Chapman, Miss V., Surrey
Chiappe, Miss C., Hull
Cobbett, Miss S. C., Surrey
Cockburn, Mrs. O. R., London
Cocking, Miss L., Cornwall
Collins, Miss S., Ashford, Middx.
Conner, Miss L., Sussex
Cottier, Miss L. G., Liverpool
Coulthard, Miss N. M., Sussex
Creasey, Miss S. D., Essex
Crofts, Mrs. P., Scotland
Curtis, Miss V. A., Essex
Dale, Miss M., Gloucester
Dance, Mrs. J., Warwicks.
Davis, Miss D. J., Surrey
Doherty, Miss P., Surrey
Dyke, Mrs. A., Herts.
Embleton, Miss E. R., Sussex
Entwistle, Miss B. P., Sussex
Escott, Mr. J. F., Hereford
Esrich, Mr. P. D., Farnborough
Flanagan, Mrs. B., Essex
Flanagan, Mr. D., Essex
Fletcher, Miss H. G., London
Flint, Mr. J. L., Kent
Fox, Mrs. H., Surrey
Garai, Miss M., London
Gibbons, Miss M. C., Birmingham
Gladwell, Mrs. E., Essex
Godwin, Mrs. G., Essex
Green, Mr. T. C., Surrey
Greenslade, Miss P. M., Bristol
Harris, Mrs. S. E. M., Herts.
Hicks, Miss W., Herts.
Holden, Miss J. M., Middlesex
Holliman, Miss J. M., Bucks.
Holyoake, Mrs. K., Herts.
Houghton, Mr. J. L., Kent
Ilott, Mrs. L., Essex
Jennings, Miss P., Essex
Kay, Miss M. M., Yorks.
Kruger, Miss S., Norway
Lane, Miss M. A., Middlesex
Lawrence, Miss J., Surrey
Lewis, Miss V., London
Lilley, Miss A. M., Cardiff
Lucyszyn, Mrs. E., London
McIntosh, Miss M., Scotland
Morris, Mr. M., Cornwall
Mottram, Mrs. K., Wolverhampton
Norman, Miss M., Suffolk
Oakley, Miss E., Worcs.
Oldfield, Mrs. J., Yorks.
Ollivant, Mrs. J. A., Yorks.
Palin, Mrs. J., Telford
Paterson, Miss K., Surrey
Pittard, Miss H. M., Bridgend, Glam.
Poole, Miss F. J., Coventry
Price, Mrs. A. G., London
Price, Mr. M. B., Lancaster
Ramsden, Miss P. J., London
Rees, Mr. P., London
Reid, Miss B., Derby
Ridyard, Miss J. E., Cheshire
Robertson, Miss A., Scotland
Robertson, Miss C. A., Scotland
Robinson, Mrs. J., London
Sharpe, Mrs. P. J., Middlesex
Smith, Miss T., London
Stanford, Miss S. G., Surrey
Stoddart, Mrs. P., Cheshire
Strange, Mrs. J., Surrey
Sullivan, Mrs. M., Essex
Taylor, Miss R., Yorks.
Tozer, Miss C., Reading
Trussler, Mrs. V. E., London
Walker, Mrs. C., Bedford
Wallman, Mrs. P. C., York
Wallner, Miss S., Mass., U.S.A.
Walshe, Miss K., Hants.
Watson, Mr. J. M., Worcs.
Webber, Miss N., Sussex
West, Miss C. M., Warwicks
Whitehurst, Miss M., Yorks.
Whitworth, Miss H., London
Williams, Miss E. A., Worcs.
Williams, Miss I. H., S. Wales
Willits, Mrs. C. F., Staffs.
Woodthorpe, Mrs. C. A., Liverpool

AFFILIATED GROUPS

Hertfordshire Secondary Teachers' (Women) Modern Dance Group.
Hatfield, Herts.

South Cheshire Dance Circle, Nantwich, Cheshire.
St. Peter's College, Brimingham

ART OF MOVEMENT STUDIO

25th ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

All Old Students please note that the 25th Anniversary Celebrations and Dinner will be held at the Studio on 10th JULY, 1971.

For further details please send a stamped and addressed envelope to:

**Miss B. Danielli (Hon. Secretary),
Guy's Lodge,
Burdham,
Sussex.**

Souvenir programmes of Kaledoscopia Viva are available
price four shillings, post free, from the Editor,
3, Beech Grove, Burton-on-Stather, Scunthorpe, Lincolnshire.



LABAN ART OF MOVEMENT GUILD

ELECTION OF OFFICERS & COUNCIL MEMBERS - 1971

The attention of all members is called to the forthcoming elections, the results of which will be declared at the Annual General Meeting in February 1971.

In accordance with the Constitution, nominations will be required for all the Officers of the Guild, except Vice-Chairman. The offices and present holders are listed below and all are eligible to stand for re-election, but Miss G. Williams stated her wish to retire.

President	Mrs. S. Bodmer
Vice-President	Mr. F.C. Lawrence
Chairman	Miss J. Russell
Secretary	Miss E.A. Osgathorp
Assist. Secretary	Miss G.M. Williams
Editor	Miss E. Smith
Treasurer	Mr. J. Kershaw

The Four retiring Council Members are:-

Miss O.M. Chapman, Miss L. Wilson, Mrs. P. Bowen-West, Mrs. D. Wells.

All are eligible to stand for re-election for a further 3 years with the exception of Miss L. Wilson.

The Secretaries will be pleased to receive nominations as soon as possible **but not later than 5th January, 1971**, c/o Mrs. D. Rickinson, 24 West Park Avenue, Kew Gardens, Surrey.

NOMINATIONS

1. Members are reminded that the Constitution requires that the President must be a Fellow of the Guild and those nominated for the offices of Vice-President, Secretary, Assistant Secretary and Editor, must be either Fellows or Full Members.
2. Members are asked to ascertain that those nominated are willing to stand for election and that he or she will be willing to attend four Council Meetings each year (usually held in London on Saturdays).
3. Each nomination must be seconded.
4. A descriptive paragraph **MUST** accompany each nomination and should include :-
 - a) Interest and experience in Art of Movement.
 - b) Experience in Committee work.
 - c) Other relevant information.

It is essential for the Secretaries to receive these paragraphs by 5th January, 1971.

PLEASE MAKE IT CLEAR FOR WHICH OFFICE EACH NOMINEE IS STANDING.